March 25, 1863, The Charleston Mercury
COLUMBIA, TENN., March 18.
In my last letter I gave you very fully the disposition of Van Dorn’s force upon Rutherford’s Creek, where he had taken position to meet the enemy. On the 10th we had retired from Spring Hill before a large force of the enemy, and taken an advantageous position, and expected on the 11th to have an engagement of short duration and retire across Duck River to this point on a pontoon bridge, which was then constructed and about to be launched. Upon attempting to launch it, it was discovered to be impossible, as the river had overflowed its banks, and was sweeping on with the greatest rapidity, bearing on its bosom huge logs and drift wood, hurled down with such velocity as to render the laying down of the pontoon an utter impossibility. To render matters still worse, the rope, by means of which the ferry boat was crossed, became submerged, and another one was with difficulty stretched across, by means of which we were enabled to cross a boat capable of carrying at each trip, occupying forty minutes, one wagon or eight or ten horses. Placed in this unfortunate position, we were completely covered by Federals in heavy force in the front and upon both flanks, without having any means of retreat in case of a superior force, which was certain, and which it was only our intention to engage and retire. Several plans of escape were suggested, among which the most plausible was to swim the horses across the stream and cross the troops by the ferry, but it was found that even this was impracticable. Our position was at the head of the peninsula formed by the junction of Carter’s creek and Duck river, while the enemy’s position was upon another peninsula directly opposite, formed by the junction of Rutherford and Carter’s creeks, all of which streams were unusually high and well nigh impassable. Our forces were disposed on the south side of Rutherford’s creek, our centre resting upon the Nashville pike, our left extending to Carter’s creek, and our right, under Forrest, extending a mile or two to the right of the pike and upon the border of Rutherford’s creek. The position was a very strong and commanding one, and King’s Battery was put upon the highest hill commanding the approaches from the pike. In front of our position, upon the centre, open fields stretched from Rutherford’s creek back a thousand yards to a wooded hill upon the left of the turnpike, upon which the enemy mounted their artillery, but which was perfectly commanded by King excellent position. From the top of this hill the movements of the enemy might plainly be described. On the 10th three brigades were plainly visible, and large wagon trains were moving in all directions. It was feared, from what could be seen of the enemy’s movements upon our right, that he was about driving wagons into Rutherford’s creek, upon which to place plank and cross his infantry, as the creek was too deep and rapid to be at all fordable. It soon became known to our troops that the pontoon had proved a provoking failure, and being aware of the enemy’s large force and his so perfectly covering our front and flank, and deeming escape improbable, their lack of confidence was plainly exhibited, and hundreds of stragglers attempted to cross by means of the ferry boats, but were prevented by the guard, who were ordered to permit none but couriers and ordnance wagons to cross. The night of the 10th was, indeed, a gloomy one, and the myriad camp fires of the enemy seen through the rain and mist in the woods in front of our position, by no means reassured our disheartened forces. At 10 o’clock at night a council of war was held, of which Forrest, Jackson, Crosby and Van Dorn were members, and the plan of escape adopted. In the morning our troops were ordered to make an unusual noise and keep up a cheering, while buglers were made to sound […..] and […..] from many more points than where we had troops. At 8 o’clock, a.m., the enemy’s battery upon the left of the turnpike opened fire upon King’s battery, and gave that officer the much desired opportunity to return fire and convince them of his whereabouts just before his battery was withdrawn several shells which he had taken from the battle field of Spring Hill were returned rapidly to the enemy to whom they originally belonged, and our battery was then taken to the ferry and crossed by the indefatigable exertions of the Captain, and the horses swam across. Upon the previous evening the Texas brigade sent word that they were upon the same side of Rutherford’s Creek as the enemy, and were unable to cross. The next thing heard of them, the enemy commenced advancing, and it is said with a smile, that to see the Texas Rangers crossing the creek one would have thought that they were crossing a turnpike instead of a rapid stream, so hastily did they effect it. At 10 o’clock, a.m., this brigade and Crosby, which has been upon our left, were withdrawn through the woods, so as to avoid being seen by the Yankee look outs, leaving their usual out-posts behind, and started upon a by-road running along the Duck River in a northeasterly direction. Forrest’s command were upon another road, running parallel with it, and Armstrong brought up the rear, with Van Dorn and staff and escort immediately in the rear of Crosby, so as to be in a position to direct movements either in front or rear in case the enemy attempted to intercept us. Everything was now under way, the artillery and wagon trains having been crossed upon the ferry and the animals swam, the position completely evacuated, save by the outposts and pickets, who were directed to withdraw so soon as we got fairly under way or the enemy should advance.
We were now all upon the retreat, and the enemy unaware of our having left, and most of the command ignorant as to our destination. At Hart’s Cross Roads, where the Franklin and Murfreesboro’ roads come together, and within a few miles of which we passed, a division of the enemy, under Sheridan, was reported, but we passed the critical point unobserved. As Crosby with his advance was about crossing Caney creek, a force appeared in sight and the fences were thrown down to form in line and meet the foe, but fortunately this foe proved to be friendly and under Forrest; and the two columns now joined and passed in column upon the same road, if road it could be called, for it was a narrow, muddy, rocky, stubby, wretched trace through an interminable forest of stunted cedars. The entire command was better […..] up,’ perhaps, than was any large number of men before, for no matter how jaded the horse, hungry or wearied the rider, the knowledge that the enemy were upon every hand, and to become a prisoner was to be sent to Camps Douglas or Chase, tended to keep every laggard or straggler in ranks. Continuing on through this knotted forest of cedars over rocks and into mud holes, we passed completely around the enemy’s right flank and within three-quarters of a mile of their encampment, and reached, at 3 o’clock on the morning of the 11th, Whitesbridge, crossing Duck river thirty miles above Columbia, but which we had travelled more than that distance to reach. Here we met Roddy’s force, and once over the river and into our own territory, a feeling of safety was indulged in, which it had before been impossible to appreciate. The command had stopped two hours during the night to feed, but this was the only delay. On, on, weary as the Wandering Jew, we tugged it through forests thick and roads most foul.
Daylight revealed to us the Lewisburg Pike, and the head of the command reached Lewisburg during the morning. At this point Van Dorn received despatches from Polk, which should have reached him at his position before the enemy, informing him that on the night of the 10th Jeff. C. Davis, of the Yankee army, marched with a division from Eaglesville at midnight, and another from Versailles, at the same time, with a view to cutting him off. Gen. Polk’s opinion was that these two division, sent from Murfreesboro’, together with the divisions of Granger and Sheridan, which were in front on Rutherford Creek, were out with a view alone to the catching of Van Dorn whole force, as the enemy had learned that we had been unsuccessful in bridging Duck River, and knew that at its height we could not do it. We then left Lewisburg at noon, and reached this point at dark last evening, fully expecting to find the enemy from bridging the river and crossing. Upon arrival here it was found that the enemy moved cautiously forward, fully assured that their trap was successful, until they reached the river at nightfall on the 11th, to find that their cage was not close enough to hold the golden bird. When they became aware that Van Dorn had passed out by their flank, they retraced their steps at a double quick to Franklin, destroying fences, corn and fodder as they went, and telling the citizens that Van Dorn had got out upon their rear and was attempting to capture Franklin and destroy their trains, but they would catch him. When Van Dorn arrived here, having passed so successfully around them, and traveled 70 miles in 36 hours, to reach a point only two miles distant, he learned that the enemy were not only deceived in regard to catching him napping but concerning his whereabouts and expecting him at Franklin.
It is clear, from the actions of the enemy, that my surmises in regard to Rosecrans attempting summarily to change his base were incorrect, and that, finding a strong mounted force, with artillery, under Van Dorn, threatening them at any and every weak point, and having learned from the Spring Hill affair what he could do, Rosecrans conceived the idea of trapping his whole command, and thus getting rid of his troublesome presence, with a view to which he detached no less or important an expedition that four divisions of his command, amounting to 30,000 men, to effect his capture, and he has now found himself further than ever from success, and is at this moment expecting Van Dorn at many points. To so perfectly deceive an enemy, outwit him, and escape from so admirable a trap, military men think is characterized with more than ordinary skill and ability. The entire command, wearied as they are with such a tiresome march, are all in the highest spirits at their admirable success, and they will soon again be upon the enemy, who made such a huge farce by attempting their capture.
I have forgotten to state at the proper point that, before we evacuated our position, the enemy had succeeded in crossing a force over Rutherford’s Creek, upon our right, and this rendered our escape still more precarious. Forrest engaged this force and drove them back, killing seven of them, – Savannah Republican.