ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 19, 1861.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War:
SIR: I inclose the copy of a letter from Captain Hunt, dated Key West, April 11, which you may think advisable to lay before the Secretary of the Navy. I may be permitted to add that the danger is a real one that Captain Hunt specifies, namely, the landing of a considerable body of hostile troops on the shore of that island, out of reach of the guns of Fort Taylor. This the fort and its garrison can in no degree prevent. If landed with heavy artillery this force may reduce the fort by siege, because as yet that part of the structure that is to cover its walls from land batteries has not been built, nor can it be erected so as to fulfill its object for a year or more.
In the mean time complete security may be assured by small, quick-armed steamers stationed at Key West and cruising in its vicinity, provided other demands of the public service will permit the Navy Department to supply such protection.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Brevet Brigadier-General.
[Inclosure.]
FORT TAYLOR, KEY WEST, FLA., April 11, 1861.
General J. G. TOTTEN, Chief Engineer, Washington, D.C.:
SIR: It will probably be known ere this time if there is reason to anticipate any active demonstration by the C. S. Army to secure possession of this work. With the probability of such an occurrence will come the duty of defeating or preventing it by anticipatory measures. It is not for me to speculate on this probability, but if it does exist it cannot be amiss for me to ask attention to the defensive problem which would then arise. I shall do this, although perfectly aware of your acquaintance with the case, and strongly hoping that a peaceful possession by the United States of this line of keys may be assured. Supererogation can be no crime in this instance.
If there is any likelihood now of a large demonstration to take this place, measures should at once be taken to prevent the landing of forces and munitions on the part of the key beyond the range of Fort Taylor guns. This landing can be made without difficulty unless something more is done, and thus regular siege can be laid to the fort. This ought to be prevented, as it can most readily by maintaining an excess of naval force. The only good landing places not commanded by our guns are along the east portion of the south beach. You will see the landing even of a siege train there would be quite practicable if left undisturbed. But if two or three naval vessels, steamers being best, of course, are stationed along the south beach at points near the shore, say one-half mile, there is enough water, and they could cover all this line by their fires, and could also watch for any rendezvous of an attacking force in the vicinity. The same result can be attained by establishing two or three batteries along that shore and having the forces stationed here increased by several hundred men. The landing of men in boats would be quite practicable with such rapidity as to speedily outnumber the permanent garrison of the key, and, indeed, I see nothing to hinder putting several thousand ashore almost before the landing is suspected. This, however, would be made an entirely fruitless operation if our naval strength and distribution were such as to make the landing of stores and munitions impracticable, and the capture of the transport fleet certain. Along the north side the water is quite shoal, and a landing of men or stores could only be made by boats or scows of light draught, and, indeed, on the south beach scows would be the landing agency for stores.
You will at once see that if we are kept restrained by a superior field force suddenly landed, the debarkation could go on if no naval interference interrupts it. Open batteries could hardly be held against the assault of superior numbers, and might be turned by landing on the north side through Boca Chica or more eastern channels.
Thus, unless we have a force superior to any likely to be landed, open batteries would be rather unsafe reliances. By using abatis, &c., some power of resistance could be given to such defensive batteries, and they might be useful adjuncts. But the best and safest reliance is in a naval cordon and reef cruisers to cut up any expedition by the roots, and forbid it any foothold on this island. Our Navy, being at once available, could crush out any demonstration and annihilate the fleet of transports on which reliance would be placed as the base of operations. The combination of a larger land artillery force with naval strength would be the same basis of defense, and this would afford the needed watch and give a chance of forming a line across the key east of the salt-house. I might discuss the strategy of the case much more, but it can hardly be needful. I should mention that the necessity of using steamers for dispatch boats in case of siege should be duly considered. Without this resource we might be for a long time shut up without information being conveyed. Whether the Havana and New York boats could be relied on then is to be doubted. On the whole, the main question is this: Are we in any danger of siege? If so, landing should be made impracticable or useless by such a concentration of force here as to control the east end of the key or to cut off all chance of landing a siege train and supplies. The attempt to use light-draught steamers to operate out of reach of naval vessels on the north side is to be considered and duly obviated.
I have been obliged to write this in haste. I do not suppose you will need to be reminded of the points considered, but it is better that I should omit nothing which might be thought my duty, should these considerations chance not to have been entertained.
Mr. Mallory wrote here, I have been told, by a recent mail, that when the C. S. Army were ready, an attempt to take these works would be made, but I do not believe this would be tried were our assured strength such as to contest the debarkation.
I am glad to say that from what I have heard to-day the secessionists here have essentially given in and are beginning to see the error of their ways. Judge Marvin has at last been induced, I believe, to hold on to his place, and I trust that all conflict of jurisdictions will now be avoided. It is surmised that Judge McIntosh may conclude not to come here at all.
Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
E. B. HUNT,
Captain of Engineers.
P. S.—Judge Marvin feels sure he will be here by the next boat, April 21. I suppose the shadow of destiny begins to show too clearly for further doubt. I think a turning point is passed, and “submission” to their former peace and quiet will, I hope, replace the rule of bad passions.
The main question is to be decided by the United States once for all, and I do not doubt that this decision is already made.
P. S.—The yellow fever is to be considered in sending men here, acclimation being very important. Crowding a large force on the key will endanger its appearance in a destructive type, and if acclimated crews and troops can be sent this would be a great safeguard.